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1International Unions
Abstract
We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the
provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The
trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts of coordination and loss of independent policymaking en-
dogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity
reduces the union’s size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive cen-
tralization. We study ﬂexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these ineﬃ-
ciencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or fed-
eral states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked
grants.
21 Introduction
Historically, the nation state has concentrated most of the authority in every
policy domain. In recent decades, however, a more complex picture has begun
to emerge, characterized by a demand for more autonomy (if not secession)
at a subnational level and, at the same time, creation or strengthening at the
supranational level of country unions which assume certain policy prerogatives.
World economic integration seems to be responsible for both developments. On
the one hand, in an integrated world, subnational jurisdictions can prosper in-
dependently because their market is the world 1. On the other hand, increasing
integration leads to more externalities, need for coordination and, in more ex-
treme cases, supranational jurisdictions. Examples of multilateral arrangements
of this kind can include world-wide organizations like the United Nations, re-
gional trade agreements, currency unions, military alliances, etc..
A prominent example is the European Union (EU), which, especially after
the Maastricht Treaty (1992), has substantially broadened its scope of action to
include, besides a common trade policy and a single internal market, a monetary
union, tightly co-ordinated ﬁscal policies and certain aspects of common domes-
tic and external policies.2 An important debate is now underway on what the
functions of the EU should be, and where the boundaries between the union’s
prerogatives and those of member nations should be placed. This debate is
spurred in particular by the ongoing preparation of a European Constitution
and by the prospective entry in the EU of a long list of applicants, mainly from
central and eastern Europe. Several observers (including Alesina, Angeloni and
Etro, 2001a, henceforth AAE) have pointed out that there are inconsistencies
between the deepening of the scope of the European Union and its enlargement.3
This paper examines the political economy of international unions of coun-
1See Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000).
2Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2001) document this trend empirically.
3See Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), Tabellini (2002) and Buti, Eijﬃnger and Franco (2002).
3tries. These are groups of countries that coordinate the provision of certain
public goods with international spillovers. We examine, in particular, what
are the forces that determine the equilibrium size and composition of unions,
and discuss the attribution of prerogatives between the union and the member
countries. The core of our model, and an element that in our view is central
to the political economy of all unions, is the existence of a tension between the
heterogeneity of individual countries’ preferences and the advantage of taking
certain decision in common.4
Our paper is related to two diﬀerent strands of literature. First, the litera-
ture on ﬁscal federalism, which goes back to Oates (1972), takes the size of a
union as given and assumes a uniform policy across countries — a feature that
characterizes what we call a “rigid union”. Recent contributions by Besley and
Coate (2003) and Lockwood (2002) have started to explore alternative arrange-
ments that do not impose policy uniformity, taking the size of the union as
given.5 A second strand of the literature discusses the endogenous determina-
tion of the size of the union, assuming policy uniformity. Work along this line
includes Alesina and Grilli (1993) and Alesina and Barro (2002) on monetary
unions and Yi (1996) on custom unions.
In this paper we make some progress in merging these two literatures. We
proceed in two steps. First, we consider a rigid union and show that it gen-
erates other ineﬃciencies beyond the lack of adaptability to local preferences
pointed out by Oates (1972). There is ﬁrst a tendency towards a reduction in
the equilibrium size of the union and hence of the externalities associated with
it (“small size bias”)6. Moreover, the political structure can prevent potentially
4For an historical analysis of union formation close to the spirit of our approach from a
political science point of view see Rector (2002).
5The focus is on legislative bargaining between countries and strategic delegation. See also
the comparisons between centralization and decentralization by Dur and Roelfsema (2002)
and Gradstein (2002) on public good provision, Etro and Giarda (2002) on redistributive
policy and Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b) on risk sharing in a federation.
6Alesina and Spolaore (1997) have emphasized a related tendency toward suboptimal size
4eﬃcient enlargements because of a form of “status quo bias”. Finally, without a
constitutional commitment to centralize only certain policies, a bias toward ex-
cessive centralization emerges (“centralization bias”), also leading to small size.
There is a time-inconsistency problem here: once the union is formed, a major-
ity of members will want to increase policy prerogatives, and the expectation of
this induces many countries to step back from the beginning. Our second step
is to remove the assumption of policy uniformity and study simple rules that
add ﬂexibility and improve the allocation of resources. Our analysis focuses on
arrangements which are central in the debate on the institutional design of the
European Union or, more generally, that are relevant in the context of exist-
ing federal structures, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates
and earmarked grants. We show under which conditions these institutions help
limiting the ineﬃciencies of a rigid union.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium size of rigid unions and discusses issues
of enlargement and the trade-oﬀ between the centralization and the size of the
union. Section 4 discusses ﬂexible unions, removing the assumption that every
member of the union has to adopt the same policy. Section 5 concludes and
indicates some avenues for further research. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a group of equally sized countries with equal economic fundamentals
and preferences within each country, while preferences diﬀer across countries.
of countries. The two results have however diﬀerent motivations. The size of countries in their
model depends on a trade-oﬀ between scale economies and cost of citizens’ distance from an
exogenous public good, while the size of unions depends on a trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts
of policy coordination and the cost of a rigid but endogenous policymaking at the union level.
Small countries are a consequence of secessions approved by majority voting within countries,
while small unions are a consequence of the loss of independent provision of national public
goods.
5Assuming exogenous income y a n dl u m ps u mt a x e sﬁnancing national public
spending gi, the utility function for the representative individual of an indepen-
dent country i is:
Ui = y − gi + αiH(gi)( 1 )
which is linear in private consumption for simplicity and where Hg(·) > 0a n d
Hgg(·) < 0. The parameters αi > 0 capture how much the representative indi-
vidual of country i values public consumption relative to private consumption:
we assume that they are observable and, without loss of generality, that coun-
tries are ordered such that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ...7
If N countries form a union, they enjoy spillovers from each other pub-
lic spending. The parameter β ∈ [0,1] captures the spillover eﬀects of public
spending in other countries. The representative individual in member country
i has the following utility function:
Ui = y − gi + αiH(gi + β
N X
j=1,j6=i
gj)( 2 )
Notice that we assume that membership in the union is a necessary condition
for receiving some externalities. Spillovers are zero if a country is out. This
is a simplifying assumption that could be relaxed without essential changes in
the results.8 We interpret gi as a public good, such as infrastructures, public
7We could employ heterogeneity in economic fundamentals (income or productivity) and
distortionary taxation obtaining similar results. For models of union formation of this kind
see Bolton and Roland (1997), AAE (2001a) and Etro and Giarda (2002).
8It is realistic to assume no spillovers between union members and outsiders in the case of
a pure public good: union members jointly produce the public good, outsiders do it separately
without interdependence. Etro (2002) extends the model allowing the outsiders to be aﬀected
by the externalities of the union and viceversa. There, it is shown that whenever strategic
sustituibility between the policies of the countries holds, as it does here, free riding by outsiders
is increased when a union is created. This reduces the equilibrium size of unions even beyond
t h es u b o p t i m a ls i z ee m p h a s i z e di no u rp a p e r .
6investment or defense. Some of our results would also apply to other forms of
international cooperation, such common domestic and external policies, trade
agreements or currency unions. The central idea is that the union improves the
coordination of some policy with international spillovers.
In a decentralized equilibrium, in which every country acts independently,
the provision of public goods would be sub-optimal because of a well known
free-riding problem. The ﬁrst best utilitarian union includes all countries and
satisﬁes the following optimality conditions for each country i:
αiHg(gi + β
X
j6=i
gj)=1− β
X
j6=i
αjHg(gj + β
X
k6=j
gk)( 3 )
This requires that the union dictates a diﬀerent policy for each country and that
the policy preferences of every country are known and veriﬁable. This seems
highly unrealistic especially if information about countries’ preferences are not
veriﬁable.
The simplest assumption about the feasible set of policies of the union,
following the standard theory of ﬁscal federalism (Oates, 1972), is that the
union is “rigid” namely every member of the union has to adopt the same
policy. In this case in order to ﬁnd the equilibrium policy one has to impose a
voting rule. We consider the one-country-one-vote case with majority voting; we
brieﬂy discuss qualiﬁed majorities below.9 Given the structure of preferences,
the median voter theorem applies and the level of spending chosen by the N-
sized union solves the following ﬁrst order condition:
αmHg{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]} =
1
1+β(N − 1)
(4)
which deﬁnes a function gm = g(αm,N)w h e r eαm is the preference parameter
of the median country in the union. In the following proposition we refer to
9Note that this is reasonable since all countries have equal size. In many unions, including
the EU voting rights are proportional to the population size of the country.
7θ(g) ≡− Hgg(g)g/Hg(g) as the elasticity of the marginal utility of public goods
(the lower is this, the more highly substitutable are private and public spending):
Proposition 1. In a rigid union, the political equilibrium provision of public
goods increases in αm and it decreases (increases) with the size of the union and
of the spillovers if the elasticity of the marginal utility of public goods is higher
(lower) than unity, while, under unitary elasticity we have size-independence.
The ambiguous eﬀect of an increase in spillovers on the union policy is due
to the usual substitution and income eﬀects. The same argument holds for
an increase in the number of members. This is relevant for the creation and
enlargement of a union. For instance, even if a new country is strictly in favor
of a small government and it will increase votes in this direction inside the union,
its entry could end up determining a bigger size government: this can happen
if the concavity of the function H(·) is not too strong. The intuition is that
in this case the substitution eﬀect (more public goods because they produce
more spillovers) more than compensates the income eﬀect (more consumption
because we have already a lot of spillovers).
3 Rigid Unions
In this section we characterize the properties of a “rigid union”, deﬁned as one
in which all members have to follow the same policy if in the union. First we
analyze what we could call an “initial stage” of union formation in which some
potential members can unilaterally join the union (an “open rule” process).
We then analyze the case in which existing union members have to approve
new entrants.10 Finally we examine multiple policies (the production of mul-
10An interesting extension would be to introduce uncertainty on the beneﬁts from mem-
bership, solved after entry, and strictly positive costs of exit. In such an environment, the
renegotiation-proof equilibrium would be aﬀected by these costs and may imply a multiple
speed entry in the union. See Bordignon and Brusco (2001) for a related analysis on secession
8tiple public goods in our model) to examine the relationship between the size
and the scope of unions. In these three steps we emphasize three ineﬃciencies
characterizing rigid unions.
3.1 The equilibrium size of the union
Consider M potential members of a union, where M is deﬁned as the set of
countries that would join a ﬁrst best union under the provisions of public goods
described by the optimality condition (3). Let us deﬁne a rigid union (αm,N)
as a group of N countries with median αm. The utility of country i in a union
(αm,N), is:
V in
i (αm,N) ≡ y − gm(αm,N)+αiH{gm(αm,N)[1 + β(N − 1)]} (5)
Clearly the utility of a country outside this union is V out
i = V in
i (αi,1).
In order to examine the size and the composition of the rigid union we need to
address questions of multiplicity of equilibria. Even for a given median country,
a simple Nash equilibrium concept would produce multiplicity of equilibria. To
see the problem consider entries on both sides of the median which enlarge the
union without changing the median itself. In fact no country may want to join
a small union but because of strategic complementaries in the entry process
a group of countries may ﬁnd in everybody’s interest to join. These diﬀerent
size unions with the same median could be Nash equilibria. To avoid this
multiplicity of equilibria, we focus on unions with a given median and adopt a
coalition-proof equilibrium concept under which not only unilateral deviations,
but all multilateral deviations (which are internally consistent) have to be non
proﬁtable. To formalize this concept we need to deﬁne α0(Γ,αm,N) as the new
median of the union (αm,N) after a set Γ(S)o fS previously outsider countries
joins to it.
rules.
9An equilibrium union (αm,N)E is a group of N countries with a median
voter characterized by αm,s u c ht h a t :
1) the union policy is chosen by the union by majority voting,
2) for each country i joining the union, V in
i (αm,N) >Vout
i , and
3) in the set of the countries outside the union, there is not a subset of S
countries Γ(S) such that:
V in
k (α0(Γ,αm,N),N+ S) >Vout
k ∀ k ∈ Γ(S)( 6 )
Under this deﬁnition there may still be multiple equilibria with diﬀerent
median countries,11 hence, for simplicity we are going to focus on the properties
of a single equilibrium union with a given median country. In other words we do
not study the optimal number of union for given conﬁguration of countries in the
world, a question which would lead us closer to the work of Alesina and Spolaore
(1997) and Alesina and Barro (2002). In all the following results we do not
impose any structure on the distribution of the preferences except for a strictly
technical one which limits the heterogeneity between countries: given αi ∈
[αmin,αmax] for any i, we will assume αmax < 2αmin. Finally we set a limit on the
concavity of the utility function: θ(g) ≥ 1/2. These assumptions are suﬃcient
but not necessary for our conclusions. If they do not hold we cannot exclude
“perverse” cases in which groups of countries with very diﬀerent preferences
form multiple unions excluding countries with intermediate preferences. For
more details on this technical point see AAE (2001a). Under these assumptions
we have:
Proposition 2. An equilibrium union is composed by countries with con-
tiguous preferences: for a given median, there exists a unique compact set of
preferences around it, such that all and only all countries with preferences in
11Allowing coalitions between union members and outsiders would reduce further this mul-
tiplicity of equilibria, but such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
10this set belong to the union; the equilibrium size of the union is (weakly) in-
creasing in the size of the spillovers.
The point of this proposition is that the equilibrium is formed by countries
with similar preferences who gain in the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts from
cooperation and the costs from the loss of independent policymaking.12 When
the size of the spillovers decreases - or the heterogeneity of preferences increases
- the equilibrium size of the union shrinks and for low enough spillovers or great
enough heterogeneity, N<M . As well known since Oates (1972), centralization
in a rigid union has the beneﬁt to internalize spillovers in policymaking and the
cost of giving up to adaptability to local preferences. Our point is that there is a
further cost from centralization in unions of independent countries: the rigidity
of central policymaking reduces the size of the union below the optimal one,
which is M in our case, and hence it reduces the total spillovers. We may call
this a “small size bias” of rigid unions.13
3.2 Enlargement
We now examine the issue of union enlargement. First of all notice that if two
new candidate countries on opposite sides of the median are considered, un-
der our assumptions they will unambiguously raise the utility of all the current
12This trade oﬀ is at the basis of related investigations on the endogenous creation of unions.
Wrede (2002) and Cernaglia (2002) extend our model introducing retrospective voting on the
politicians in the former and legislative bargaining in the latter. Brou and Ruta (2002) and
Cheikbossian (2002) extend our model to examine the role of special interest politics and
rent-seeking activities. Perotti (2001) and Facchini (2002) study the political economy of a
common market.
13Even mantaining the uniform policy assumption of the rigid union, there are partial
solutions to this ineﬃciency. One would be a system of side payments toward countries with
extreme preferences to induce them to join the union. To some extent these transfers would
be selﬁnanced through the new spillovers created. Another partial solution would be the
adoption of a system of legislative bargaining where the agenda setter chooses a policy and a
size of the union under the constraint that all its members are better oﬀ inside the union.
11members and so they will all be admitted. This implies that the interesting
problem is the admission of a single country. We will study under which condi-
tions such an enlargement takes place as a single event. However, an important
paper by Roberts (1999) has studied a general model of dynamic enlargement
of a union. In such a model, the entry of a new member changes the median
and subsequent decisions about policy and further enlargement will be taken
by a diﬀerent set of countries; nevertheless, Roberts has shown that a median
voter theorem holds also in such a model even if its steady states may not be
political equilibria of the static game. Our model is a particular case of what
he calls “expansionary clubs” and his results apply to it.14 Our analysis will
diﬀer because we will just analyze the candidacy of a single country. Anyway,
our results should be seen as complementary to Roberts’ ones in showing the
existence of a “status quo bias” in the enlargement processes: enlargement and
creation of new spillovers may be opposed (or postponed) by members of the
union who do not want to give up to their political power in the union.
Let us begin with the case in which a simple majority of members is needed
to admit a new entrant. Its potential entry has two eﬀects. The ﬁrst is to
increase utility by virtue of the internalized externality, the second is to change
the median voter in the union: a majority of the members must enjoy a pos-
itive net gain from these eﬀect. Moreover, there cannot be an admission with
contemporaneous exit of a previous member: otherwise spillovers would not in-
crease, but the median would change, making impossible a majority in favor of
the entrant. These two constraints motivate the following:
Proposition 3. An equilibrium union will always accept by majority voting
two new members on opposite sides of the median and will accept by majority
14The only diﬀerence is that Roberts considers expansion only in one direction of the pref-
erence parameter. However, in a dynamic version of our model all the couple of countries on
the opposite side of the median and closer to it would be immediately admitted: afterwards
the dynamic would be the same predicted by the Roberts’ model.
12voting a single new member if and only if the change in the median after entry
is small enough.
Thus, just countries close enough to the current median of the union are ac-
cepted. Hence our model rationalizes a form of status-quo bias in union reforms:
informally, it is ineﬃcient to give up to new spillovers for political reasons. Note
that the spirit of our result goes through if the admission of more countries to-
gether is allowed and all these countries are on the same side of the median.
Clearly a partial solution would be an admission without voting power, which
would allow any country to be admitted. This is what recently happened when
Russia joined the NATO, but it is hard to imagine such a solution in the Euro-
pean Union.
3.3 Qualiﬁed majorities
In many unions (including the EU) admission of new members requires much
more stringent procedures, like qualiﬁed majority or even unanimity.15 In these
cases the status quo bias is just reinforced. Consider unanimity for instance.
The pivotal country is that with the preferences furthest away on the opposite
side of the median with respect to the candidate country. This pivotal country
will compare the change of its utility due to the increase in externalities with
that coming from the policy change due to the new median and vote accordingly.
This country will block the new entrant if its utility decreases. Note that under
majority voting we had to make sure that this same country was not exiting
the union; that is we needed that its utility remained above the reservation
utility of being out even though it might decrease due to the new entrant. With
unanimity we have to make sure that this country is actually (weakly) better oﬀ
after the enlargement, which is a more stringent requirement. More generally,
in any case of qualiﬁed majority voting, the set of admissible entrants is smaller
15For a discussion of qualiﬁed majority procedure also in the choice on the provision of
public goods see AAE (2001b).
13than in the case of majority voting and what we called the status quo bias of
the union is larger.
3.4 Size and scope of the union
We now extend the simple policy model of the union to multiple policies. Imag-
ine F diﬀerent types of public goods, ordered by the intensity of spillovers,
β1 > β2 > ···> βF. Assuming separability between subutilities, the utility
function is now:16
Ui = y −
F X
k=1
gk
i + αi
F X
k=1
H
"
gk
i +
P
j6=i
βkgk
j
#
(7)
Let us deﬁne with V G
i (αm,N) the utility of country i joining a union of N
members with median αm and producing the set of public goods G - for instance,
if F =2 ,G may be (1,2) or (1) or (2)-, and with V out
i = V G
i (αi,1) the utility
from the decentralized production of the same set of goods. According to the
voting procedure in the union, diﬀerent results may arise. The common and
realistic assumption is that only after the creation of the union, its members,
which are committed to be in it, decide on policymaking in the union, while
the outsiders choose independently on all their policies. We will discuss two
diﬀerent kinds of equilibria, characterized by the following alternative voting
rules within the union:
Rule A. The provisions of each public good are chosen sequentially by ma-
jority voting.
Rule B. The policies to centralize are chosen by majority voting and, subse-
quently, for each centralized policy, the provisions of each public good are chosen
sequentially by majority voting.
16Our result would not change qualitatively if the distribution of preferences, as reasonable,
was diﬀerent across policies (in that case the median country would diﬀer between diﬀerent
policies).
14The diﬀerence between rule A and B is that the latter allows a two step
decision: ﬁrst which policy to centralize, and then how much of each public
good to provide. Notice that there is just a diﬀerence in procedures, not in
what is the feasible set of options.
A X-equilibrium union (αm,N,G)E is a group of N countries with a median
voter characterized by αm, providing a set of public goods G, such that:
1) rule X ∈ (A,B) applies;
2) for each country i joining the union, V G
i (αm,N) >Vout
i , and
3) in the set of the countries outside the union there is not a subset of S
members Γ(S) such that:
V G
k (α0(Γ,αm,N),N+ S) >Vout
k ∀ k ∈ Γ(S)( 8 )
Note that the ﬁrst stage of voting with Rule B (i.e. which policies to cen-
tralize) may appear multidimensional leading to Condorcet cycles. However
given the structure of the model the voting space can be reduced to a unidimen-
sional space. In fact everybody agrees that if K policies have to be centralized it
will be the K policies with the highest spillovers. In other words, issue-by-issue
voting and separable preference guarantee the existence of a single Condorcet
winner at each voting stage. In Appendix we prove existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium under both rules and:
Proposition 4. An equilibrium union is composed by countries with con-
tiguous preferences and for a given median, rule B implies a (weakly) greater size
and a (weakly) smaller set of centralized policies than rule A and it is preferred
by at least a majority of countries.
If Rule A is adopted, all policies are centralized obtaining a relatively “small”
but highly centralized union. An interesting feature of this equilibrium is that it
is possible that a majority of members would prefer to centralize only the policies
with higher spillovers, even though, in an A-equilibrium this does not happen.
15More in general, Rule A generates a size of the union (weakly) smaller than
the one obtained under Rule B which is also (weakly) smaller than the optimal
one (again the full set of potential members): hence we have a further form of
ineﬃciency under Rule A, whose source is the centralization of all policies.17
Unfortunately, this “centralization bias” in the union is quite pervasive, since it
is due to a time-inconsistency problem: once the union is formed, the median
extends excessively its powers, and the expectation of this induces too many
countries to step back from the beginning.
The intuition for the equilibrium outcome under rule B is the following.
Member countries rationally foresee the provision of public goods chosen by
the median for each centralized policy and this makes the extreme countries
worse oﬀ when the number of centralized policies increases. For this reason
extreme countries ( on both sides of the median, i.e. both those countries that
would ﬁnd the median provision of certain policies to low or to high) vote for
the centralization of only few policies while the median country votes for the
centralization of all policies. Hence, the median number of centralized policies is
typically lower than F as long as heterogeneity within the union is great enough.
Given this, some extreme countries may still choose not to join the union in the
initial stage, but membership must be at least as great as under rule A, since
the latter implies centralization of all policies.
In other words, we have shown that a strong commitment of the union to
centralize only a limited set of policies - those with the strongest spillovers
between members - can induce the creation of a bigger union and is preferred
by at least a majority of members. Our results suggest that there are beneﬁts
for the forthcoming European Constitution to set clear limits on which policy
prerogatives belong to the EU. This is indeed one of the most debated issues in
17Despite general welfare comparisons are impossible, it is easy to build examples in which
rule B strictly dominates rule A, that is, its adoption makes all countries at least as well oﬀ
and at least one of them strictly better oﬀ (because of the increase in the size and in the
spillovers), while the opposite can never be true.
16the Constitutional Convention.
4 Flexible Unions
In the previous section we have shown the existence of three forms of ineﬃciency
in the creation of a rigid union: policy uniformity reduces memberships and
hence the associated spillovers; a status quo bias limits enlargement, especially
when candidate countries diﬀer from the incumbents and when super-majorities
are required for admitting new members; in the absence of a commitment to lim-
ited delegation of powers to the union, there is excessive centralization leading
to reduction in the size of the union.
This section will study four forms of ﬂexible unions, i.e. unions where poli-
cies diﬀer among members, which reduce these ineﬃciencies. We know that
optimality requires diﬀerent policies for diﬀerent members. However implemen-
tation of the ﬁrst best raises two sets of problems. First, the organizational costs
of discriminating policy across the membership could be very large. This could
perhaps be modelled by adding a variable cost, increasing with the complexity
(in terms of diﬀerences in policies). Second, and perhaps more importantly, to
the extent that preferences are not veriﬁable, countries would have an incentive
to declare and act upon preferences diﬀerent from their own. It is therefore
instructive to check how various “simple” arrangements - based on simple rules
applying equally to all countries - can improve upon the rigid union without
requiring the institutional complexity of the ﬁr s tb e s ta r r a n g e m e n t .
4.1 Enhanced cooperation
Under this arrangement, subsets of union members are free to centralize certain
policies among themselves, without the other members of the union participat-
ing. Allowing certain countries to centralize some policies at the union level and
other countries to centralize other policies reduces the centralization bias em-
17phasized in the previous section. Indeed, in a multiple policies model, enhanced
cooperation corresponds to the formation of many unions, whose size is (weakly)
increasing in the spillovers associated with the policy.
This arrangement is a reality in the EU, where for example just some mem-
bers have adopted the single currency or agreed on common border controls.
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) has introduced a formal framework for forms of
enhanced cooperation, whereby any group of (at least eight) members to take
action in particular areas, while other members opt out.18 This arrangement
clearly (at least weakly) increases the size of the union which is now the set
of countries willing to centralize the policy with highest spillovers. This in-
stitutional design is favored by countries with very diﬀerent preferences from
the median country and it encourages enlargement, but countries close to the
median may prefer rules like rule A and B of the previous section which imply
higher centralization and smaller participation. The advantage of this form of
ﬂexibility would be enhanced if both preferences and spillovers are heteroge-
neous, but presumably, implementation costs may become very large if this is
pushed toward an extreme diversiﬁcation. For further details see AAE (2001a).
4.2 Subsidiarity
We now analyze another form of ﬂexibility, the principle of subsidiarity. This
corresponds to a well known feature of the European Union, laid out in Article
3b of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), that states that “In areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accor-
dance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives
o ft h ep r o p o s e da c t i o nc a n n o tb es u ﬃciently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or eﬀects of the proposed action, be better
18Bordignon and Brusco (2003) introduce uncertainty on the beneﬁto fc o o r d i n a t i o ni na
model of union formation and rationalize enhanced cooperation as an optimal step toward full
coordination.
18achieved by the Community”. In other words, public policies should be assigned
to the lowest level of government which is capable of successfully achieving their
objectives (see Inman and Rubenfeld, 1998). In our model we have exactly a
situation were each member’s policy does not internalize the eﬀects on the other
members and so it cannot suﬃciently achieve its objectives. Hence, the principle
of subsidiarity implies that the union should complement countries’ expenditure
in the public good with an additional expenditure at the union level.
Formally, a union (αm,N) chooses an expenditure gU
m by majority voting
(the median voter theorem still holds), while each country i chooses gn
i ∈ (0,y−
gU
m ). Utility for country i is now:
Ui = y − gn
i − gU
m + αiH

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 (9)
The timing assumption in our description of the principle of subsidiarity is that
the countries choose their individual public expenditure in a ﬁrst stage, and the
union decides a complementary expenditure in a second stage. In particular, the
median country will choose gU
m to maximize Um. Given the expectation E(gU
m ),
all the countries in the ﬁrst stage choose gn
i = gn ¡
αi,E(gU
m )
¢
, i =1 ,2,...,N,t o
maximize Ui. In equilibrium it must be E(gU
m )=gU
m . Given this, the sub-game
perfect equilibrium is deﬁned by the following system of N +1e q u a t i o n s :
αiHg

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 ≤
1
1+[ 1+β(N − 1)]
∂gU
m
∂gn
i
, (10)
gn
i ≥ 0 i =1 ,2,...,N
αmHg

gn
m + β
X
j6=m
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 =
1
[1 + β(N − 1)]
(11)
Given
P
j6=m gn
j as chosen in the ﬁrst stage, the last equation deﬁnes gU
m =
gU
m
³
αm,
P
j6=m gn
j
´
as a function increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing
19in the second one with:
dgU
m
dgn
i
= −
β
[1 + β(N − 1)]
Substituting this in (10) we obtain that for all countries individually providing
additional public goods:
αiHg

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 =
1
1 − β
(12)
Hence, we have shown that gU
m
¡
αm,
P
gn
j
¢
≤ gU
m (αm,0) and that αiHg(·) < 1
for any i ≤ m.W ep r o v e :
Proposition 5. With subsidiarity 1) the expenditure of the union is lower
than the one adopted by a rigid union, 2) the median country and all countries
with weaker preferences for the public good do not add any individual expen-
diture and 3) the countries with strongest preferences for the public good add
individual expenditure. In a rigid union with a given median, the adoption of a
complementary structure is Pareto-eﬃcient and (weakly) enlarges the union.
The outcome is a compromise between the decentralized one and the rigid
one. Countries with lower α will spend less then in a rigid union, while beneﬁting
from the additional expenditure of countries with opposite preferences: hence
they are better oﬀ. The median country must be better oﬀ because it is always
able to replicate the public expenditure of the rigid system (with the opportunity
to be better oﬀ if some countries provide further expenditure). Hence a strict
majority is in favor of the ﬂexible system. The other countries on the one hand
are worse oﬀ because the union is providing less public good, and on the other
hand they are better oﬀ because to some extent they can individually repair to
this. It turns out that the second eﬀect is always prevailing. Notice that while
the union expenditure is chosen internalizing the externalities across countries
as in the rigid union, the free riding of the single countries is enhanced: even
for those countries which add individual expenditure, the private cost of it is
20not 1 as in a decentralized setting, but 1/(1 −β) > 1 which is increasing in the
spillovers. The status quo bias of the rigid union is limited under subsidiarity:
for instance, it is much easier to admit countries with preferences for higher
public spending than the median, since beyond changing the median, they are
going to provide extra public goods.
4.3 Federal mandates
An alternative arrangement that we analyze in this section is the “federal man-
date”: each country can choose and independently ﬁnance public expenditure,
but this must be at least equal to a level decided at the union level. Hence
each country chooses an individual provision on top of the one decided by the
federation. We can think of the situation in which the union moves ﬁrst and
the country later on as a description of federal mandates.19 In this context the
subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by the system:
αiHg

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 =1 f o r i = N − ˜ N,...,N (13)
gn
i =0f o r i =1 ,2,...,m,...,N − ˜ N
αmHg

β
X
j6=m
gn
j + gU
m [1+ β(N − 1)]

 =
h
1+β( ˜ N − 1)
i
[1 + β(N − 1)](1 − β)
(14)
so that ˜ N countries add individual public expenditure to the amount gU
m decided
as the federal mandate. As long as ˜ N ≥ 1 a free riding behavior on the part
of the same union emerges: for the union, the marginal cost of public spending
is greater than 1, which remains the marginal cost of each single country as in
the decentralized setting, but it is smaller than the one of a rigid union. This
19Cremer and Palfrey (2000) have studied this kind of federal mandates, however in their
model there are not externalities between countries. In our model, instead, the federal man-
date accomplishes an important role: it limits the free-riding of the decentralized equilibrium
internalizing to some extent the externalities produced in public good provision.
21further free-riding of the union may induce some countries after the median to
prefer a rigid union. However we can show:
Proposition 6. The adoption of a federal mandate implies that 1) the fed-
eral mandate is lower than the public expenditure adopted by the rigid union,
2) the median country and all countries with weaker preferences for the public
good do not add any individual expenditure and 3) the countries with strongest
preference for the public good add individual expenditure. As long as total spend-
ing increases, the adoption of a federal mandate is Pareto-eﬃcient and (weakly)
enlarges the union.
4.4 Earmarked grants
We now study a simple system of taxes and subsidies which is inspired by
widespread forms of intergovernmental transfers usually referred to as ear-
marked grants (as opposed to block grants, whose purpose is purely redistribu-
tive). An example is in the way the European Union creates incentives for
regional investment through Structural Funds. Certain kinds of investment,
especially those located in poorer regions, aimed at their development or to
environmental protection and characterized by spillovers on the Community, is
subsidized by the European Union: for each Euro devoted to it, a supplementary
fraction is added by the Union. As we will see, such a system may have positive
consequences, up to implementing the ﬁrst best union, but even negative ones,
up to inducing the collapse of the union. The result depends on the distribution
of preferences across countries.
In AAE (2001b) we study more general tax systems, but here we focus
on a constant subsidy s for unit of national expenditure, ﬁnanced with taxes
Ti = s¯ g−i,w h e r e¯ g−i is the average of all other countries expenditures: hence
the tax paid by country i is independent from its choice of spending and the
union budget constraint is always satisﬁed. We can write the problem of each
22country i a st h ec h o i c eo fgi to maximize:
Ui = y − gi − Ti + αiH

gi(1+ s)+β
X
j6=i
gj(1 + s)

 (15)
The choice of each country generates spending gi = gi(s) which is increasing
(constant) in the subsidy if and only if θ < (=)1. Hence indirect utility for
country i is:
Vi ≡ y − gi(s) − s
P
j6=i gj(s)
N − 1
+ αiH



(1 + s)

gi(s)+β
X
j6=i
gj(s)





(16)
Maximizing this with respect to the subsidy provides the optimal subsidy
for country i. It turns out that under weak conditions, we have an interior
equilibrium which is increasing in αi, hence the median voter theorem holds,
and the political equilibrium subsidy sm satisﬁes:
·
N − 1
1+sm
¸·
gm(sm)
¯ g−m
+ β(N − 1) − (1 + sm)
¸
=[ sm − β(N − 1)]


X
j6=m
g0
j(sm)


(17)
In this formula, the left hand side represents the direct eﬀect of a change in the
subsidy and it is evaluated according to the preference for public spending of
the median country compared to the average one. The right hand side is the
indirect eﬀect due to the impact on public spending in other countries: when
the subsidy is low (which implies underspending), the indirect marginal eﬀect
of an increase in the subsidy is beneﬁcial only if it increases spending by the
other countries (if θ < 1). As we will prove, the subsidy s∗ = β(N −1) delivers
the ﬁrst best allocation of public expenditure. The intuition for this is quite
simple. The additional expenditure in the public good which is provided by the
union distorts the incentives to invest in the public good. These incentives are
the same for every country as in the ﬁrst best if the marginal cost of public
23expenditure equates its social marginal cost. But this is the same for every
c o u n t r ya n dg i v e nb y1 /[1+β(N −1)], hence this equality is satisﬁed under the
proposed subsidy. Now, it is immediate to verify from (17) that if θ > 1, we
have a subsidy above the optimal one whenever median public spending is more
than average, while if θ < 1, we have a subsidy below the optimal one whenever
median public spending is less than average. In the simple case of logarithmic
preferences we have sm = s∗ +( gm − ¯ g−m)/¯ g−m.20 More importantly we have:
Proposition 7. The adoption of a subsidy to national public expenditure
implements the ﬁrst best allocation of public expenditure if and only if median
public spending is the same as the average. Under this condition there is always
a system of transfers that gives rise to the ﬁrst best union.
Informally, as long as the median country is not excessively biased toward
low or high public expenditure compared to the average country, a union close to
the ﬁrst best can be created with a system of taxes and transfers. Unfortunately,
this does not need to be the case: the political equilibrium subsidy might be
too low (or even negative) to be accepted by countries with high preference for
public spending (this is more likely when β and αm are small and θ large) or
too high to be accepted by countries with low preferences for public spending.
Moreover, AAE (2001b) provide a wide discussion on the many reasons for which
such a system may not work in general21 and may be hardly implementable in
practice. Nevertheless, our result shows that a system of intergovernmental
20Under isoelastic preferences, we have:
sm =
θ[s∗ +( gm − ¯ g−m)/¯ g−m]+( 1− θ)s∗(1 + s∗ − β)
1+( s∗ − β)(1− θ)
21With more general utility functions the ﬁr s tb e s tw o u l dn o tb ea t t a i n a b l ew i t has i m p l e
subsidy even without further distorsions. Notice also that if transfers contingent on preferences
hose implicitly in Proposition 7) were not allowed, participation to the union by all countries
may not be feasible.
24transfers could be very useful to enlarge the beneﬁts of policy coordination at
least in a union with a balanced distribution of preferences.
5 Conclusions
We modelled an international union as a set of heterogeneous countries deciding
together on the provision of certain public goods (or policies) that generate ex-
ternalities across union members. First, we have characterized the equilibrium
size of a “rigid” union — one in which the provision of the public good is homo-
geneous across members — showing that several ineﬃciencies arise, beyond that
emphasized by Oates (1972). Second, we have analyzed some simple forms of
“ﬂexibility” that can generate welfare improvements by removing the assump-
tion of uniform provision. Our choice of ﬂexible rules was inspired mainly by
the current debate on the institutional architecture of the European Union. We
have shown how some forms of ﬂexibility (such as subsidiarity, federal man-
dates, enhanced cooperation, and earmarked grants) can improve welfare and
even, under restrictive conditions, attain the social optimum.
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that the size of the member coun-
tries is given and equal, that the beneﬁts from membership are certain and the
cost of leaving the union is nil, and that there are no organizational costs in
implementing our forms of ﬂexibility. Each of these assumptions is restrictive,
and their relaxation would represent useful avenues for further research.
First, one could analyze the relationship between the union and the size if
countries, the focus of Alesina and Spolaore (1997). Recent history has been
characterized, especially in Europe, by the co-existence of centrifugal forces
within nations (pressure towards regional autonomy in most Western European
countries and the break-up of some Eastern European nations) and centripetal
forces at a supranational level (the tendency to delegate policies to superna-
tional entities like the European Union). These two forces may have a natural
25interconnection: the beneﬁts from participating in international unions may re-
duce the equilibrium size of nations. Separatism within nations and delegation
of policies to supernational entities could well be shown, by future research, to
be complementary parts of the same process.
Second, the beneﬁts from membership in a union are often uncertain and
the cost of leaving a union are obviously large, as history (where cases of union
break-ups are rare) shows. Removing the assumption of no cost under uncer-
tainty on the beneﬁts of membership would change the composition, size and
scope of the union and rationalize forms of multiple speed unions or progressive
enlargement.
Thirdly, there is obviously a limit to how complex the institutional arrange-
ment of a ﬂexible union can be. Realistic models should incorporate a trade-oﬀ
between institutional simplicity and the ability of the union to attain good wel-
fare properties by getting closer to the preferences of each member. This element
of realism is missing in our models. The history of existing unions should again
provide a rich source of inspiration in this respect.
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28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By total diﬀerentiation of (4) we have:
dgm
dαm
=
gm
αmθ(·)
> 0,
dgm
dβ(N − 1)
=
gm
[1 + β(N − 1)]
µ
1 − θ(·)
θ(·)
¶
which implies the result. Q.E.D.
In order to prove Propositions 2-4 we need to ﬁrst establish two lemmas:
Lemma 1. The net gain from participating to a union ∆(α,β) is a concave
function in the preference parameter α w h i c hh a sp o s i t i v ev a l u eo n l yf o rac l o s e d
set of values of α.
For a given union (αm,N) and spillovers β,w ec a nd e ﬁne the net utility of staying
into it for the country with preferences αi as the function:
∆(αi,β) ≡ V in
i (αm,N) − V out
i =
= αi [H{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]} − H(go(αi))] − [gm − go(αi)]
where go(αi) ≡ g(αi,1) is the independent choice of public provision of country i,
which satisﬁes αiHg(go)=1 . Using the envelope theorem we have:
∆α = H{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]} − H(go(α)),
∆αα = −Hg(go(α))go0(α) < 0
which shows concavity in α.M o r e o v e r , ∆(0,β) < 0 and ∆α(0,β) > 0. This and
the fact that ∆(αm,β) > 0 and ∆α(αm,β) > 0 (which derives from a simple
revealed preference argument) imply the existence of a cut-oﬀ αl(β) < αm such that
∆(αl,β)=0and ∆α(αl,β) > 0. We can have two alternative cases. In the ﬁrst
case, we have gm[1 + β(N − 1)] >yand the function ∆(α,β) is always positive,
increasing and with slope approaching a constant for α → Hg(y)−1 and equal to
this constant there on. Hence, ∆(α,β) > 0 for any α ∈ (αl,∞).I f i n s t e a d t h e
29median country of the union has a low enough αm so that gm[1 + β(N −1)] ≤ y, it
follows that ∆α(α,β) equals a negative constant for α ≥ Hg(y)−1, which implies that
∆(α,β) < 0 for α high enough. It follows the existence of a unique value ˆ α > αm,
deﬁned by H{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]} = H(go(ˆ α)) such that ∆α(αi,β) T 0 if and only
if α S ˆ α.T h i sa n dt h ec o n c a v i t yo f∆(·) imply that there must exist an other cut-oﬀ
αu(β) > αm such that ∆(αu,β)=0and ∆α(αu,β) < 0.H e n c e∆(αi,β) > 0 for
any αi ∈ (αl,αu). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. When a country k outside a union enters in it, utility from
staying in the union is increased for the new member k and for any country i
on the same side of the median m as the new member, and when two countries
on opposite sides of the union enter in it, all countries are better oﬀ.
We need to show that, for any i ≤ m when k ≤ m,a n df o ra n yi ≥ m when
k ≥ m we have V in
i (α0(αk,αm,N),N+1 )>Vin
i (αm,N). The eﬀects induced by
entry are to move the median of the union towards the entrant, and to increase the
number of members, which has an ambiguous eﬀe c to nt h eu n i o np o l i c y .H o w e v e r ,t o
prove the claim it is suﬃcient to show that both eﬀects are going in the right direction.
Let us consider the eﬀect of a change in the number of countries for a given median.
Using (4) and its comparative statics properties in Proposition 1, we have:
∂V in
i (αm,N)
∂N
=
βgm(αm,N)
[1 + β(N − 1)]
·
1 −
µ
αi − αm
αi
¶µ
1 −
1
θ(·)
¶¸
αi
αm
which is positive if there is not too much heterogeneity and the H(·) is concave enough.
Our assumptions are suﬃcient conditions for this (indeed, the assumption αmax <
2αmin amounts to an upper bound on the heterogeneity of the preferences since it can
be rewritten as αmax − αmin < αmin). This also shows that when two countries on
opposite sides of the median enter the union, this shows that all countries are better
oﬀ.L e tu sﬁnally consider the eﬀect of a change in the median for a given number of
countries:
∂V in
i (αm,N)
∂αm
=
µ
αi − αm
αm
¶
gm(αm,N)
αmθ(·)
30where we used (4) and its comparative statics properties in the second line. But
α0(αk,αm,N) S αm if and only if αi S αm,h e n c et h es i g no f(α0(αi,αm,N) −
αm)
£
∂V in
i (αm,N)/∂αm
¤
i st h es a m eo f[αi − αm]
2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. First notice that for a given median there can
be only one equilibrium union: if there were more, some countries would be better
oﬀ in the largest one, hence they could form a coalition and proﬁtably enter in any
of the smaller unions, contraddicting their coalition-proofness.
22 Now, consider the
case of Lemma 1 in which gm[1 + β(N − 1)] ≤ y and αl(β) and αu(β) are de-
ﬁned as the preferences for which the utility from staying in a union (αm,N) is
the same as the utility from staying out of it. First we will show that these values
are the lower and upper bounds such that all and only all the countries i ∈ (l,u)
belong to the equilibrium union and then we will show that ∂αl(β)/∂β < 0 and
∂αu(β)/∂β > 0. The proof is analogous when gm[1 + β(N − 1)] >y . Suppose
that a country k ∈ (l,u) does not belong to the equilibrium union. Notice that from
Lemma 2 V in
k (α0(αk,αm,N),N+1 )≥ V in
k (αm,N). Because of this and the fact
that ∆(αk,β) > 0 , it follows:
V in
k (α0(αk,αm,N),N+1 )− V out
k >Vin
k (αm,N) − V out
k = ∆(αk,β) > 0
This contradicts the fact that (αm,N)E was an equilibrium union. Now suppose
that a country k/ ∈ (l,u) belongs to the equilibrium union. Since ∆(αk,β) ≤ 0 by
construction, it is clearly better for the country to stay out. Again, this contradicts
the fact that (αm,N)E was an equilibrium union. The cut-oﬀs αl(β) and αu(β) are
deﬁned in Lemma 1 by the function:
[H[gm(αm,N)(1 + β(N − 1)] − H(go(α))] =
gm(αm,N) − go(α)
α
22Between the Nash equilibria with a given median, the unique coalition proof equi-
librium is the largest one (see AAE, 2001a). This result depends on the high degree
of sustituibility between national public goods. In the opposite and extreme case of
perfect complements there would not even be a union in equilibrium. We are grateful
to a referee for pointing this out.
31Total diﬀerentiation with respect to α and β and repeated use of (4) and the optimality
conditions of the outsiders provide:
dα
dβ
= −
gm(αm,N)(N − 1)α
[1 + β(N − 1)]∆α(α,β)αm
·
1 −
µ
α − αm
α
¶µ
1 −
1
θ(·)
¶¸
whose sign, under our assumptions, is the opposite of the sign of ∆α(α,β) -t h ep r o o f
of this follows the one in Lemma 2. Since ∆α(αl,β) > 0 and ∆α(αu,β) < 0, αl(β)
is decreasing in β and αu(β) is increasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will prove that an equilibrium union (αm,N)E
accepts any new member k if and only if | α0(αk,αm,N)−αm |< ¯ ² for some ¯ ²>0.
Deﬁne ² ≡ α0(αk,αm,N) − αm and assume that αk > αm so that ²>0 (the
argument is symmetric in the opposite case). Country 1 will not exit from the union
after entry of country k if and only if V in
1 [α0(αk,α1,N),N +1 ]>V out
1 .I f t h i s
condition does not always hold, that is if V in
1 [αN,N+1]<Vout
1 , it holds if and only
if ² is lower than a cut-oﬀ ˆ ² deﬁned by:
[H[gm(αm +ˆ ²,N +1 ) ( 1+βN)] − H(go(α1))] =
gm(αm +ˆ ²,N +1 )− go(α1)
α1
Now consider the median country m. This country will support k’s admission
if and only if V in
m [α0(αk,αm,N),N +1 ] >V in
m (αm,N). If this condition does
not always hold, that is if V in
m [αm+1,N+1 ]<Vin
m [αm,N], it holds if and only if
² ∈ [αm+1 − αm] is lower than a cut-oﬀ ˜ ² such that:
[H[gm(αm +˜ ²,N + 1)(1 + βN)] − H{gm(αm,N)[1 + β(N − 1)]}]=
= α−1
m [gm(αm +˜ ²,N +1 )− gm(αm,N)]
The claim follows setting ¯ ² =m i n ( ˆ ²,˜ ²). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Separability in the subutilities of the public goods
implies that in a union (αm,N,G) the net gain for a country with preferences αi is:
Π(αi,G)=
X
k∈G
∆(αi,βk)
32which deﬁnes a continuous function in α. By Lemma 1 we know that ∆(α,βk) > 0
for any α ∈ Ak where Ak is a set such that AF ⊂ AF−1 ⊂ ···⊂ A1.W i t h a n
abuse of notation, let us denote with K the set {∅,1,2,··· ,k} ⊆ Z+.H e n c e , b y
the properties of a vertical sum of functions, Π(αi,G) > 0 for any α ∈ Sk where
SF ⊂ SF−1 ⊂ ···⊂ S1.M o r e o v e r ,Π(αi,K+1 )> Π(αi,K) for any α ∈ Sk and
Π(αi,K+1 )< Π(αi,K) for any α / ∈ Sk . In any sub-game perfect equilibrium it
must be Π(αi,G) > 0 for each country i joining the union.
In any union, sequential voting on public good provision implies that the median
voter theorem holds for any policy and independently from the order in which policies
are voted on. Under rule A, once the union is created, the median country is going
to choose its favourite provision of each public good and G = F:h e n c e ,f o rag i v e n
median the equilibrium always exists and it is unique (it may be degenerate and include
just one country). Under rule B, the same choice of the median country emerges for
each policy which is centralised. Let us now consider the stage in which member
countries vote on which policy to centralize. Since ∆β(α,β) > 0,i tm u s tb et h a t
whenever a country wants (not) to centralise policy z, the same country wants (not)
to centralise any policy k<(>)z: hence we can reduce the set of choice to the set
of possible numbers of centralised policies K ⊆ F (taking as given that if K policies
are centralised, these are the K policies with highest spillovers). To apply the median
voter theorem to this unidimensional set we need to verify single-peakedness: this
holds because each country i has a single prefered set of centralized choices Ki with
1 ⊆ K1 ⊆ K2 ·· ·⊆ Km−1 ⊆ Km = F and 1 ⊆ KN ⊆ KN−1 ·· ·⊆ Km+1 ⊆
Km = F. Consequently, under rule B, a set of policies F ⊆ G is centralized. Also
under rule B, for a given median, the equilibrium exists and it is unique, but the
reason is diﬀerent and it depends on its coalition proofness. Imagine that there are
two equilibria: (αm,N,F)E and (αm,N0,F0)E. Our discussion implies a negative
correlation between membership and set of centralized policies: if N>N 0 then
F ⊂ F0 and viceversa. In this case it must be that the countries excluded by the
smallest equilibrium could form a coalition and be better oﬀ joining the smallest
33union, which contraddicts its equilibrium properties.
Finally in equilibrium under rule B it must be that Π(α,G) > Π(α,F) for a
majority of countries, otherwise a greater set of centralized policies would have been
chosen in equilibrium. For more discussion and examples see AAE (2001a). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The ﬁrst part of the proof is in the text. Now,
consider the diﬀerence between utility from the equilibria under a complementary
union and under a rigid union:
Ω(αi) ≡ αiH

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 +
−αiHg{gm(αm,N)[1 + β(N − 1)]}+gm(αm,N)−gn
i −gU
m
which is a continuous function of αi for given all αj with j 6= i. Comparing equilibrium
conditions (4) and (11), it follows that β
P
j6=i gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)] = gm[1 +
β(N − 1)]. Hence, for all countries i ≤ m and the other countries for which gn
i =0 ,
it must be Ω(αi)=gm−gU
m > 0 and Ω0(αi)=0 . Now, let us consider the countries
for which gn
i > 0. In this case, making use of (12) we have:
Ω0(αi)=H

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

−H{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]}+
+
β
1 − β
∂
h
gn
i + β
P
j6=i gn
j
i
∂αi
whose last term can be easily veriﬁed to be positive. Moreover, since gn
i +β
P
j6=i gn
j +
gU
m [1+β(N−1)] > β
P
gn
j +gU
m [1+β(N−1)] = gm[1+β(N−1)], iit follows that
Ω0(αi) > 0, and hence, every country is better oﬀ under the complementary union.
Since the net gain function unambiguously moves upward, the set of preferences for
which it is better to join the union expands. Hence the equilibrium union can only
enlarge after the adoption of a complementary structure. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us consider the case of federal mandates, in
which the union moves ﬁrst. The median country chooses gU
m
n
αm,E
hP
j6=m gn
j
io
,
34where E
hP
j6=m gn
j
i
is the expectation of the sum of the individual expenditures of
all the countries, to maximize Um. Then, all the countries choose gn
i , i =1 ,2,...,N,
to maximize Ui. In equilibrium it must be E
hP
j6=m gn
j
i
=
P
j6=m gn
j .G i v e nt h i s ,
the equilibrium is deﬁned by the following (diﬀerential) system of N +1equations:
23
αiHg

gn
i + β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

≤ 1,gn
i ≥ 0 i =1 ,2,...,N
αmHg

gn
m + β
X
j6=m
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

=
1
[1 + β(N − 1)] + β
P
j6=m
∂gn
j
∂gU
m
Notice that for a given gU
m ,t h eﬁrst N equations deﬁne gn
i = gn(αi,gU
m ) as func-
tions increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second one when positive.
Hence [1 + β(N − 1)] + β
P
j6=m
∂gn
j
∂gU
m ∈ (1,1+β(N − 1)].
24 This implies 1) that
gU
m
³
αm,
P
j6=mgn
j
´
≤ gU
m (αm,0),a n dt h a t2 )αiHg(·) < 1 for any i ≤ m. Finally,
3) positive individual provision is chosen by all countries to the right of the cut-oﬀ αb
deﬁned by:
25
αbHg

β
X
j>b
gn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)]

=1
Now, by totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition for the individual
contributions, we obtain:
dgn
i
dgU
m
= −[1 + β(N − 1)] − β
X
j>b,j6=i
dgn
j
dgU
m
Subtracting from both sides β
dgn
i
dgU
m
and summing over all j>bwe get:
X
j>b
dgn
j
dgU
m
= − ˜ N



[1 + β(N − 1)] +
P
j>b
dgn
j
dgU
m
1 − β



= −
˜ N[1 + β(N − 1)] h
1+β( ˜ N − 1)
i
23In this case, it can be veriﬁed that single-peakedness always holds in the ﬁrst stage.
24We are implicitly assuming that g
U
m > 0. otherwise we would be back at the
decentralized equilibrium.
25Obviously, if αb > αN, we are back to the equilibrium with a rigid union.
35where ˜ N is the number of countries with αj > αb, that is the number of coun-
tries providing individual public expenditure, as previously determined. Finally, sub-
stituting in the equilibrium condition for the federal choice of the median coun-
try (14) follows. Hence, in this case, comparing (14) with (4) we conclude that
gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)] < β
P
j>bgn
j + gU
m [1 + β(N − 1)] <g m[1 + β(N − 1)] that is
gU
m <g m.
To prove the last part of the Proposition, consider the diﬀerence between utility
from the equilibria under a federal mandate union and under a rigid union for a given
median:
Ψ(αi) ≡ αiH

gn
i (αi)+β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1+ β(N − 1)]

 +
−αiHg{gm(αm,N)[1 + β(N − 1)]}+gm(αm,N)−gn
i (αi)−gU
m
which is a continuous function of αi for given all αj with j 6= i. By revealed preference,
it must be Ψ(αm) ≥ 0 with strict inequality if ˜ N ≥ 1.C l e a r l y , w e h a v e Ψ(αi)=
Ψ(αm) ≥ 0 for any country with gn
i =0 .For αi > αb, using (13) we obtain:
Ψ0(αi)=H

gn
i (αi)+β
X
j6=i
gn
j + gU
m [1+ β(N − 1)]

−H{gm(αm,N)[1 + β(N − 1)]}
which is a convex U curve (since Ψ00(αi) > 0) reaching a global minimum at ˆ α such
that Ψ0(ˆ α)=0 . However,
Ψ(ˆ α)= gm(αm,N)−gU
m −gn
i (ˆ α)=
β
1 − β


X
j>b
gn
j + NgU
m − Ngm


where we used the deﬁnition of ˆ α. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for every country being
better oﬀ by adopting a federal mandate system is that this increases total spending.
Under this condition, the net gain function unambiguously moves upward and the set
of preferences for which it is better to join the union expands. Hence the equilibrium
union can only enlarge after the adoption of a federal mandate system. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 7. First we prove that the ﬁrst best can be achieved
with the susbsidy s∗ = β(N − 1).L e tu sr e w r i t e( 3 )a s
36αiHg(g
∗
i+β
X
j6=i
g∗
j)=
1 − β
PN
j=1 αjHg(g∗
j + β
P
k6=j g∗
k)
(1 − β)
and sum over all i’s, we obtain:
N X
j=1
αiHg(g
∗
i+β
X
j6=i
g∗
j)=N
"
1 − β
PN
j=1 αjHg(g∗
j + β
P
k6=j g∗
k)
(1 − β)
#
=
=
µ
1+
βN
1 − β
¶−1 µ
N
1 − β
¶
=
N
1+β(N − 1)
Substituting in the previous equation we obtain the equivalent expression:
αiHg(g
∗
i+β
X
j6=i
g∗
j)=
1 − β N
1+β(N−1)
(1 − β)
=
1
1+β(N − 1)
Clearly the proposed optimal subsidy is such that the equilibrium ﬁrst order conditions
and the ﬁr s tb e s to n e sh a v et h es a m es o l u t i o n sgi[1+β(N−1)] = g∗
i for i =1 ,...,N.
Second, public spending maximizing (15) satisﬁes:
αiHg



(1 + s)

gi + β
X
j6=i
gj





(1 + s)= 1 with g0
i(s)=
gi + β
P
j6=i gj
(1 + s)
µ
1 − θi(s)
θi(s)
¶
where θi(s) ≡ θ
h
gi(s)+β
P
j6=i gj(s)
i
. Using the envelope condition, the subsidy
maximizing (16) for the median country must satisfy the ﬁrst order condition (17) -
the second order condition is assumed satisﬁed - which, using g0
i(sm), can be rewritten
as:
·
gm(sm)
¯ g−m
+ s∗ − 1 − sm
¸
=
·
sm
N − 1
− β
¸X
j6=i
1 − θj(sm)
θj(sm)

gj(sm)+β
X
k6=m
gk(sm)


Notice that single-peakedness of preferences requires ∂2Vi/∂s∂αi > 0,w h i c hh o l d s
under weak conditions and is assumed here. In conclusion it is immediate to verify
that when gm(sm)=¯ g−m it must be sm = s∗. The tax system implies that Ti is
decreasing in αi. If this makes some countries with low preference for public spending
worse oﬀ compared to be outside the union, quasilinearity implies that there is always
a transfer which does not aﬀect the allocation of public spending but makes those
countries better oﬀ. Q.E.D.
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